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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Emigration State: Race, Citizenship and Settler Imperialism in Modern British History, c. 1850–1972

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Abstract

What role did migration play in the making of modern Britain? We now have a good sense of how ethnicity, class, religion and gender structured immigrants' experience and what impact they had on Britain's culture, society and economy. But as Nancy Green pointed out almost two decades ago, scholars of migration must focus on exit as well as entry. Such a call to study 'the politics of exit' is especially apposite in the case of the UK. For in every decade between 1850 and 1980 (with the exception of the 1930s), the UK experienced net emigration year on year. This article analyses this outflow of migrants to reveal a new vision of the UK as an 'emigration state'. The article employs this concept to make a new argument about the formation of migration policy in the UK and offers a revised account of the geographical boundaries of the modern British state.

What role did migration play in the making of modern Britain? We now have a good sense of the way ethnicity, class, religion and gender structured immigrants' experience and how immigration has affected Britain's culture, society and economy.[1] But as Nancy Green (2005) pointed out almost two decades ago, scholars of migration must focus on entry and exit as well. Such a call to study 'the politics of exit' is especially apposite in the case of the UK. For in every decade between 1850 and 1980 (with the exception of the 1930s), the UK experienced net emigration year on year. In that period as many as 24 million people left the Atlantic Archipelago (Mitchell, 1992, pp. 128, 132, 135) (Figure 1).

How might studying emigration affect our understanding of immigration history? And how might studying immigration and emigration together transform our sense of the chronological and geographical boundaries of modern Britain? This article answers these questions by building on research by Ellen Boucher (2014), Marjory Harper (2022), Bill Schwarz (2011) and Jean Smith (2021). All these scholars show how migration from the UK to Australia, South Africa, Canada, Zimbabwe and Aotearoa New Zealand affected British social policy and ideas of

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

F I G U R E 1 Estimated Passenger Numbers Arriving and Leaving the UK between 1850 and 1980 (in 1000 s). The blue line representing in-migration, green line, out migration, grey line net migration. *Source*: Mitchell, 1992, pp. 128, 132, 135. Mitchell's data is based on the following: 1815–1876-intercontinental passengers to and from U. K. ports (including Irish ports); 1876–1919-intercontinental citizen passengers to and from U.K. ports; 1920–1963intercontinental migration of U.K. and Commonwealth citizens for permanent residence; 1964 onwards-all migration of U.K. and Commonwealth citizens, other than to and from Ireland. Explained in Mitchell, 1992, p. 137
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

ethnicity and nationality.[2] Read together, these works suggest that long before Commonwealth migration sparked debates about race, identity and citizenship in the 1950s and 1960s, migration from Britain to the Commonwealth had transformed the UK state and its boundaries.

This article follows the lead of this recent research and argues that we can think of the men and women who arrived in the UK in the postwar decades as migrating in the opposite 'direction', as it were, to a long-running circuit of outward migration that had led to the emergence of a transnational British state and an identity politics centred on the supposed racial supremacy of British emigrants. Connecting histories of emigration and immigration in this way unites the history of the 'global colour line' (Lake & Reynolds, 2008), the 'Angloworld' (Belich, 2009) and British immigration history. As such, this analysis moves scholarly debate about migration history beyond a 'methodologically nationalist' framework, which 'presupposes that the relevant entities to be related are a nation/state/ society […] on the one hand, and immigrants coming from outside this nation/state/society on the other' (Wimmer & Schiller, 2002, p. 310).[3]

Adopting such a conception of the UK's migration history between 1850 and 1970 would clearly be misleading. For on the basis of the chart above, the UK seems less like a national 'container' and more like a bucket full of holes.[4] This more expansive and porous conceptualization of the UK's borders will also prompt us to reimagine our histories of modern state formation. On that subject, scholars typically focus on welfare, warfare, bureaucracy and expertise within the geographical boundaries of the post-1922 United Kingdom.[5] By bringing scholarship on the state and migration together this article focuses on the transnational connections of people, power and policy that made the modern British state.

To make this argument I propose a new concept: the 'emigration state'.[6] What is an emigration state? An emigration state is a state that turns the emigration of its citizens into an imperialist policy that connects metropolitan cores to settler peripheries. This concept heeds James Hollifield's (2004) call to bring the state back in to migration studies. But whereas Hollifield poses a paradox whereby western states have struggled since 1945 to square their national form with transnational (im)migration, the 'emigration state' presupposes that the UK's modern state has its origins in imperial migrations that have always been transnational. Transnational migration did not challenge the UK state, rather managing transnational migration was a core way that the UK projected power and defined its citizenship laws throughout the modern period. In this sense, the emigration state supports Radhika Mongia's (2018) contention that control of intraimperial migration created some main features of the modern state: the sense of a bordered territory, possession of passports and definitions of citizenship as nationality/ethnicity.

Another potential strength of the 'emigration state' concept is the scope it affords for comparative analysis. Subsidised emigration has been a crucial, although relatively understudied, component of statecraft since the middle of the nineteenth

century.[7] As the political scientist Aristide Zolberg (2010) argues, throughout Europe and beyond states were transformed during the nineteenth century by what he has termed the 'exit revolution'. In similar vein, the historian of eastern Europe Tara Zahra (2016) writes that the realisation that 'emigration could be manipulated like the steam valve on a teapot […] as an instrument of policy, to serve both domestic and international goals was one of the most consequential political discoveries of nineteenth-century European states' (p. 6).[8]

How does the UK's emigration state fare in this comparative context? In brief, the UK (including Ireland up to 1922) jetted out the greatest volume of 'steam' when compared to other European states, to extend Tara Zahra's metaphor.[9] Not only that, but it was ruled by generations of politicians who almost always wanted to turn up the heat, to take Zahra's metaphor even further. This is in stark contrast to many other European states where politicians tended to possess more chary views of emigration. While I only gesture at points throughout this article at the potential for comparative study of emigration and state formation, this is, to my mind, one of the most promising avenues for further research, both as a way to particularise the UK's modern history and also to make it immediately, vitally connected to Japanese, German, French, Russian, Portuguese, Italian (the list could go on) states' attitudes to emigration, empire, state building and citizenship.[10]

To tack back to British historiography, how does focusing on emigration reframe what we know already about immigration history? My contention is that both the volume and extent of state-subsidised emigration has had an under acknowledged effect on the drafting of the UK's citizenship and nationality laws. Centring this long history of migration control can help address one part of what Kennetta Hammond Perry (2018) calls 'undoing the work of the Windrush narrative' by focusing on the 'broader terrain of disenfranchisement, injustice and disavowal that has historically shaped Black people's relationship to British citizenship and, by proxy, the British state.'[11] When we study emigration from Britain alongside emigration and immigration from India and the Caribbean over the relatively *longue durée* we see how the UK's emigration state—as an uneven *trans-imperial migration regime*—ultimately afforded different status and value depending on a migrant's place of origin and their destination: high value and high status for migrants transiting across the Empire from the UK to the settler colonies and low status and low value for those moving from the so-called 'dependent' Empire to the settler colonies and to the UK (Atkinson, 2016; El-Enany, 2020; Mongia, 2018). The 'emigration state' names the processual development of these priorities over time in law, policy, infrastructure and ideology.

Before elaborating this argument, it is important to note the trade-offs involved in jumping up to this abstracted level of analysis over such a long time span. The state-centric account given below picks up a trend common amongst sociologists since at least the 1970s and 1980s to study racialisation and the role of the state when explaining the development of the UK's hostile immigration regime (Perry, 2014, pp. 653–654; Sivanandan, 1976).[12] Yet how coherent was this state? The constitutive tensions between the metropolitan core and the settler colonies/Dominions will need more research: Canada, Australia etc. all had their own immigration policies.[13] Meanwhile the 'core' itself was transformed in 1921/22 by the Anglo-Irish Treaty and then by the foundation of the Republic of Ireland in 1948.[14]

How 'British', then, was the UK's emigration state? Irish emigration has its own rich historiography developed in light of the social and political history of modern Ireland and especially focused on the effects of the Great Famine of 1845–1852.[15] Moreover, Irish emigrants were never merely an extension of Britain's state power, not least because Ireland itself was the subject of a long history of settler-colonial expropriation and because a part of the diaspora provided material and ideological support for republicanism and/or home rule (Kenny, 2004; Delaney, 2014, pp. 133–134).[16] For all these reasons my initial analysis presented in this article risks animating a state with a problematic geography, very few people, much hegemony and little resistance.[17]

Yet despite these issues, I still think there are interpretive merits and analytical pay-offs to be gained from a study of emigration, citizenship and the state over such a long time span. This article sketches out some of the promises of this new approach by providing a historiographical review of the relevant literature. This reliance on what historians would call works of secondary literature puts this essay in the field of historical sociology. My approach is theoretically in alignment with what William H. Sewell (2005) terms 'eventful sociology': analysing the processual concatenation of structures that form what Sewell calls 'long chains' of open-ended events (Ch. 3).[18] In this sense, I do not claim that the 'emigration state' was a 'thing', but rather that we should understand it as a social and political process: an always contested formation arising from competing priorities and accommodations. I call this formation an emigration *state* because it was centrally concerned with

ascribing citizenship and because it was afforded power by politicians seeking to subsidise and direct flows of people using state power and state funds in pursuit of enhanced state capacity.

With this concept of the 'emigration state' in mind, the history of modern Britain can be seen in new light. We no longer see a tale of liberalism passing into social democracy and then into neoliberalism, as James Vernon (2017) has argued. Nor are we presented with a narrative that moves from a more global to a more national state by the 1950s, as David Edgerton (2018) has recently suggested. British citizenship legislation constructed a transnational state associated with the settler Commonwealth. This state extended outward beyond a 'national' frame of reference from the late Victorian period until at least the 1970s (it was only in 1999 that Australia's High Court accepted that Britain should be legally treated as a 'foreign' country) (Hopkins, 2008, p. 229). In this sense, the UK was not a nation state that 'possessed' an empire (as some kind of modular extension of a prior national unit). Rather, the UK was one dominant part of an empire state structured by what John Torpey (1998) calls control over the 'legitimate means of movement'.[19]

I make this argument in three parts. In the first section, I argue that emigration has had an underappreciated impact on UK politics and society. By the inter-war years emigration was associated with whiteness and 'selfgovernment' and I focus, in particular, on the decision by the UK government to subsidise emigration to the colonies in the 1922 Empire Settlement Act. The second section shows how the rejection by the 'self-governing Dominions' of Indian claims upon a supposedly transportable imperial citizenship illustrates the racialised logic of Britain's emigration state. For the emigration state not only subsidised emigration from the UK but implied that other forms of mobility should be blocked or reduced. The final section focuses on UK migration controls in the twentieth century and the continuation and tightening of measures around racialized mobility in response to decolonization and the persistence of subsidised emigration.

An apotheosis of a sort was reached when the principle of *jus soli* (birthright citizenship) was revoked in UK law during the 1980s, while, at the same time, the descendants of many emigrants who had travelled to Canada, Australia and New Zealand had their rights protected in the offer of 'patrial' citizenship (El-Enany, 2020, p. 118). As a result of these priorities many British citizens had their citizenship status changed in the so-called 'Windrush scandal'. As we shall see in the final section of this essay, decolonization, in this sense, meant the decades-long process whereby the global colour line passed into the domestic colour bar before being inscribed in the body of British citizenship law. This, I contend, is the legacy of what I call here Britain's 'emigration state' and this essay offers a genealogy of it.

EMIGRATION, SETTLER IMPERIALISM AND THE GROWTH OF THE 'ANGLOWORLD'

With promises of supposedly empty space to farm, ever-greater numbers of European settlers spread into the lands of Indigenous and Aboriginal peoples in the nineteenth century; they brought grazing herds and crops with them; genocide and expropriation followed (Canny, 1994; Crosby, 2004).[20] Cheaper transport, the huge growth of transoceanic trade and the defeat of Napoleonic France at sea in 1805 accelerated this process and led to the formation of what the historian James Belich (2009) calls the 'Angloworld'. Railroads and telegraph cables, canals and roads connected settlers' farms to the rapidly urbanising British mainland and to the new cities erupting out of the grasslands of Australia, Canada and the US Midwest. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Native American, Indigenous, Aboriginal and First Nations peoples that survived after widespread resistance had largely been evicted to 'reserves', often on the least fertile land and far away from mineral deposits (Bayly, 2004: Ch. 12; Subramanian, 2019). The demographics of Aotearoa New Zealand provides one example of the global phenomenon that Chris Bayly labelled the 'white deluge': in the 1842 census the European diaspora stood at 2,000 and the Māori population at an estimated 80,000. By 1896 the white population was recorded at 700,000 and the Māori population had halved, to 40,000. Disease, warfare and expropriation, Bayly (2004) writes, 'tipped the balance of ethnic power in favour of the *pakeha*, or whites.' (p. 441).

The sheer mass of migrating Europeans played a decisive role: about 60 million emigrated to the world's settler colonies in the century after 1820 (O'Rourke & Williamson, 1999, p. 119). For the settlers of the 1900s, emigration was often seen as a way to improve one's life chances (think of Jack and Fabrizio's excitement at winning their tickets for the *Titanic* at the outset of that film). But in the 1830s, emigration tended to be seen as a wrench, as a dangerous and perilous venture and often as a

matter of permanent exile. Convict transport, especially to Australia, gave emigration a bad press in Britain (Harling, 2014). In Ireland, the Great Famine of 1845–1852 caused the death of over a million people and impelled 2.1 million men and women to leave the country, leading the population to decline by a third. Opposition to British rule and the push factors of poverty and famine meant that a sense of exile and even banishment attached to the experience of many Irish migrants in the diaspora (Kenny, 2017, pp. 410, 419).

Alongside these 'push' factors, 'pull' factors also played a role throughout Britain and Ireland especially after the 1850s, when cheaper freight rates offered the possibility of return migration and swifter, more reliable communications offered migrants to means to stay in contact with family and friends back home (Magee & Thompson, 2010, p. 62). With high wages on offer in the Americas, frenzied goldrush speculation in South Africa, Australia and California and a whole industry of agents touting migration as an alluring prospect, millions stepped aboard ships for hopes of a better life in the settler colonies. Most of these migrants travelled as adults, mostly alone, or as part of a small family unit; most were young, most were men and by the end of the nineteenth century most came from urban centres rather than from the countryside (O'Rourke & Williamson, 1999, p. 123; Erickson, 1994, Ch. 3).

Emigration and economic development went hand in hand, and they put the British Empire at the leading edge of the global economy by the second half of the nineteenth century (Belich, 2009). The world-transforming effects of emigration were clear to contemporaries, too. To some Victorian intellectuals, mass emigration led to visions of a 'Greater Britain': a globe-spanning polity of emigrants with the British metropole at its core providing cultural norms and a well spring of settlers (Bell, 2016, p. 167). William Gladstone (1878), however, thought settler colonialism should be lauded as progress and improvement, but the 'dissociating ocean' that split the UK from its settler colonies meant that to conceive of Britain's emigration state as ruling over 'continuous territories, is a superstition equally gross and mischievous.' To proponents of the ideal of Greater Britain, however, like the historian, J.R. Seeley, their hope was that 'Canada and Australia would be to us as Kent and Cornwall' (Bell, 2016, p. 167). And a growing chorus longed for a 'seamless continuity' between 'mother country' and overseas settlements (Bell, 2016, p. 174). A political movement arose in Britain over the following decades, led by the likes of Joseph Chamberlain, Alfred Milner and his 'kindergarten' in support of this view (Dubow, 1997; Stokes, 1962).

In the settler colonies themselves, opinion was divided over the coordinating role of Britain in its emigration state. The different diasporas from the four nations struggled over the 'Britishness' of 'Greater Britain', with some commentators differentiating between Irish, English, Welsh and Scottish migrants as different national races, challenging the idea that Europeans were all rendered equally 'white' at the frontiers of the settler Empire (Hall & Malcolm, 2016; McCarthy, 2017, p. 490).[21] Yet while ethnic, racial and religious prejudices were certainly carried from the UK to the settler colonies, these differences were subsequently transformed by opposition to Asian migration and by the structure of settler-colonial expropriation of Indigenous peoples (Lake & Reynolds, 2008). In Australia and New Zealand, especially, a 'Britannic' identity emerged that was capacious enough to allow political elites from the four nations of the UK to integrate their differences into a common political identity and narrow enough to justify the exclusion of Asian migrants and sometimes the elimination of Indigenous peoples (Darwin, 2009, pp. 178–179).

As part of this process some European writers began to imagine themselves as superior 'stock' spreading across the world at the expense of what they considered to be 'lower races', whose destiny was to die out (Lindqvuist, 2014, pp. 105–114). This led a number of intellectuals and scientists to argue that European emigrants possessed some natural predisposition to rule over supposedly inferior populations and that their elimination of Indigenous peoples and their cultures was justified by laws of evolution and natural selection (Bell, 2016, pp. 175– 176; Bosma, 2007, pp. 116–123).[22] This account of European supremacy was connected to a theory of state formation in the British Empire: when enough Britons populated a colony, Westminster should allow them 'selfrule', an ideal that bolstered the rights of people of British descent to have some measure of lawmaking powers in British colonies, erasing the prior claims of First Nations' self-determination (Lake & Reynolds, 2008, pp. 6, 8; Kirkby, 2019).

This process quickened towards the end of the century when the British overseas began to compare themselves with Asian diasporas and see in these other transnational groups a threat to their power, sexuality, wealth and 'self-government' (Smith et al., 2021, p. 4). To protect the 'self-rule' these colonies had achieved, as well as the spoils of land expropriated from prior residents, the settler colonies proceeded to develop a transnational migration regime to bar all except 'white' or

sometimes 'Anglo-Saxon' migrants from their colonies (Bueltmann, 2012). This blockade was then militarized by nationalists in these so-called 'white Dominions' who saw in Britain's Royal Navy their only protection against the rising power of Japan and as a bulwark against their longstanding opposition to Chinese migration (Offer, 1989). To this extent migration restrictions strengthened the ties between the colonies and Britain such that when the First World War broke out, solidarity amongst 'Britannic' residents in the Dominions allowed the UK to draw on their resources and manpower (Offer, 1989, p. 214). Thus the emigration boom went hand in hand with state formation in the settler colonies and a burgeoning transnational politics of racial supremacy that ricocheted back into a tightening of ideological, political, economic and military bonds with the UK (more on this in part 2 of this essay below).

Meanwhile, in the UK itself, emigration was affecting the social structure from top to bottom. In Ireland, the effects of emigration were most stark, leading to a drastic population decline that throttled the growth of towns and cities. From another perspective, however, emigration from Ireland provided an economic and political 'vent', reducing competition for resources, growing remittances from abroad and, Kevin Kenny (2017) argues, perhaps even increasing the living standard of those families left behind living in rural poverty (p. 415). In England, emigration and internal migration to urban centres left a lack of workers in the agricultural sector, with towns and cities reliant on food imported from abroad (Offer, 1989, p. 4). Grain from Canada and the US and meat from Australasia and South America were crucial to feed the UK's workers.

This precipitated new calculations about national defence. As late Victorian worries about war in Europe intensified, food shipments would, it was thought, play a major role in any future conflict. In this context, a consciousness of the power of the British overseas and the settler colonies' control over large parts of Europe's food supply led to an ideology at the apex of the British imperial elite that Avner Offer has called the 'Dominion dimension' (Offer, 1989, Ch. 18). This policy was supported by a number of Edwardian Admirals and civil servants and proposed that with control of the Atlantic sea lanes, Britain could deter rivals with the threat of starvation and thus avoid the war with Germany that many worried was looming.

As with defence, so emigration's effects can be discerned in social and economic policy. Malthusian arguments supported emigration as a 'safety valve' for the expulsion of the poor, while, from the mid-19th century, an additional calculus arose as politicians and intellectuals saw a large population in the colonies as a marker of national strength (Levitan, 2015, p. 71). To the politician and intellectual John Stuart Mill, emigration could solve the problem of overpopulation and poverty in Britain, so long as it was overseen by enlightened policy makers (Bell, 2010). By the late Victorian period, many social reformers concurred and saw emigration as a salve for the ills of the urban poor. For these reasons, members of the Victorian and Edwardian elite tended to support emigration, however they differed over whether the state should sponsor it.

While central government in Whitehall tended to stay out of the picture in the nineteenth century, by the 1890s laws provided a framework for deciding on who had custody in the case of unaccompanied child emigration (Lamont et al., 2020). These reforms grew up in response to the growth of industrial schools and philanthropic organizations which sent out children to the settler colonies, most prominently Barnardo's (Boucher, 2014; Ch. 1; Moss et al., 2017). So the UK state was there, but as a regulating, rather than sustaining, force.

A more active role for the state grew from another legal framework amidst the provisions of the New Poor Law after 1834, where parishes could send out paupers to the colonies, though relatively few seem to have taken this step (Aristide Zolberg (2010) reckons around 14,000 from England and Wales (p. 47)). The scale of Poor Law migration was greatest in Ireland, where, during the Great Famine, workhouses sponsored the emigration of 20,000 inmates in the nine years between 1846 and 1855 and landlords sponsored a further 50–100,000 of the destitute poor to emigrate (Hirota, 2017, p. 17). However, in Ireland, as in England and Wales, assisted migration only represented a small proportion of the over 2 million men and women who left mainly for North America in those years. Likewise assisted child emigration was only ever a small part (perhaps 90,000 from Great Britain between the 1860s and the 1920s) of the mass transfer of 16 million Britons overseas between 1815 and 1914.[23] In sum, the vast majority of the millions of emigrants who left England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland between 1850 and 1914 were adults or family groups; they left under their own steam and for a variety of reasons that ranged from fleeing destitution, starvation and disease to the pursuit of better wages and standards of living abroad. The state, to the extent that it intervened, mostly did so at the margins of a great rush for the exit.

This largely uncoordinated mass migration gripped the imagination of a group of reformers who sought a more active role for the state in subsidising and directing Britain's emigrants to the Empire. In every decade or so, from the 1870s onwards,

one or other pressure group in Britain sought to collectivise existing efforts to transplant the poor to the settler colonies under the umbrella of a state-aided emigration scheme (Malchow, 1979). Some of the settler colonies, meanwhile, (especially Australia and New Zealand) offered assisted passages to encourage migrants to settle there (Richards, 2004, pp. 189, 195, 2003; Moran, 1994; Baines, 1995, pp. 46–48). However, a commitment to *laissez faire* amongst Westminster's MPs led to doubts about the effectiveness of subsidies. If emigrants were paid, the logic went, then fewer would leave because the economic incentives would change (Malchow, 1979, p. 39). In addition, the aims of the pro-emigration lobby were sometimes resisted in the settler colonies themselves. Lawmakers in Canada often baulked at the idea of receiving a mass of the urban 'residuum', rather than self-financing migrants, those selected for passage schemes who were likely to bring capital and skills with them or those who came with agricultural experience from the countryside (Cavell, 2006).[24] In sum, a commitment to limited government and a lack of imperial coordination nixed the Victorian campaigners' goal to transform Britain from a *de facto* into a *de jure* emigration state.

But in 1922 the state stepped in. Under the provision of the Empire Settlement Act 486,000 UK emigrants received financial support for their outbound passage between 1922 and 1936. Subsidies would be passed in a series of subsequent 5-year tranches until 1972 (Constantine, 2003, p. 22). This spate of government intervention strengthened an existing trend that saw UK migrants turn from the USA to the British Empire after 1900. While a majority of UK emigrants had gone to the USA in the nineteenth century, things began to change at the turn of the century. The USA was declining as a destination for English, Welsh and Scottish emigrants by the 1900s: after 1905 Canada drew more British migrants every year than the USA did (Baines, 2002, pp. 62–65). This swing towards Empire, discernible since the *fin de siècle*, then accelerated after 1922 with government subsidy and US immigration laws, such that between 1925 and 1929 77.7% of emigrants from the UK went to Empire destinations
(Constantine, 2003, p. 20).

Irish migration was transformed in the 1920s, too, first with the foundation of the Free State and then by the onset of US immigration restrictions after the 1924 Immigration Act. While the 1920s saw existing trends in British migrants to travel in increasing numbers to the Empire merely strengthened, rather than changed, Irish emigration diverged in a different direction: three quarters of emigrants from the Free State in the inter-war years would travel to Britain, the rest mostly going to the Empire (Kenny, 2017, p. 411).[25]

For these reasons, I suggest that 1922 was a significant turning point and that we can profitably split the period covered by this essay, from the 1850s to the 1970s, in two: up to 1922 and after. In the first period up to 1922, the growth of trade, the efforts of social reformers and the sum of individual initiative conspired to send UK migrants in their millions overseas eventually to foment an ideal of 'self-government' in the settler colonies. We might call this process settler-imperialism-*in-itself*, where emigration proceeded through an aggregate of individual, uncoordinated action associated with civil society organisations, labour market integration and state formation at the violent frontiers of the 'Angloworld'. We then see an era of settler-imperialism-*for-itself* in 1922 when the UK government kickstarted the flow of emigration after the sudden stop of the First World War. The difference between settler-imperialism-*in-itself* and *for-itself* relies precisely on the conscious control of emigration by state actors as a tool of global power politics.[26]

The turning point, in this regard, came with the passing of the Empire Settlement Act in 1922. That Act had its antecedents amongst the ideas of pro-emigration pressure groups of the late Victorian era, but its necessary cause was the decision made by members of the Imperial War Cabinet to settle large British populations after the First World War in the Dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, whose men had died to defend the nerve centre of the Imperium in Western Europe (Williams, 1990). The passing of the Empire Settlement Act in 1922 represented a recognition of the importance of the settler colonies to Britain's defence and to its economic recovery and it was a major victory for imperialists in the Conservative Party, who managed to win over a political class that had been previously sceptical of imperial coordination on emigration (Kennedy, 1988). These politicians had prevailed over otherwise sceptical liberals because of the panic that resulted from the disastrous economic crash of 1919–1921, and the mass unemployment that resulted. The recession was so deep and the inability of l/ Liberals to deal with the shock so profound that even David Lloyd George, a longstanding opponent of state-aided emigration, came around to the idea towards the end of 1920 and Labour followed suit by supporting the policy

in 1921 (ibid: 418). Sponsoring emigration was increasingly seen by politicians across the parties as a way to pursue imperial state-making, boost trade with friendly 'kith and kin' and maintain the loyalty of settler states for imperial defence.[27]

In comparative European terms UK politicians' reflex to promote settler-imperial-for-itself during the 1920s is striking. According to Tara Zahra it was precisely in the wake of the First World War that anti-emigrationist arguments sounded loudest amongst politicians in eastern Europe, where mass emigration led to worries about losing citizens and soldiers to other states (Zahra, 2016, p. 106). In Italy, this process was delayed until the late 1920s, after the USA's tightening immigration laws in the mid 1920s dashed hopes that emigration would continue to act as a vent for the poor. By the late 1920s, Mussolini's fascist government turned against subsidised migration, pursuing, instead, a policy that sought to boost emigrants' patriotism abroad while developing Italy's countryside as a form of 'internal colonisation' (Finkelstein, 1988, pp. 45–47). Meanwhile, in France, policy makers tended to take a sceptical view of emigration throughout the period covered in this essay. For almost a century after the passing of Article 17 of the Napoleonic Code, citizens lost their citizenship if they set up their life abroad outside a French colony and the French state focused most of its efforts at economic and political development within the 'hexagon' (Green, 2005, pp. 275–276). This resulted in the lowest rate of emigration in relation to population of any of its close neighbours (Zolberg, 2010, p. 52). French emigration schemes were limited to North Africa, where 950,000 settlers lived in Algeria by 1936 (for comparison, the UK sent out the same number of settlers to the Commonwealth in the six years after 1945 alone) (Heffernan, 1995, p. 35). This is only a brief sketch of comparative approaches to emigration and state making in the inter-war years and more research needs to be done on processes of emulation and imitation in the construction of these states, which I hope scholars of other regions and nations might take up and debate.

While in most of these case cited above, Tara Zahra's teapot metaphor evaporating steam provides a broadly helpful picture of emigration policy, it does not adequately reflect British statecraft. British imperial policy after 1922 sought to keep control over the direction of emigrants by settling them in British-controlled territories, whereas, for example, the Italian government, sought mainly to strengthen ties with Italian settlements mostly in other sovereign states (Choate, 2007) (although further research is needed on the Italian push for colonies in the 1930s, as well as Nazi policy in eastern Europe).[28] Britain's emigration state was therefore less like Zahra's metaphor of a teapot, where the state risked losing control of the 'steam' once it had evaporated, and more like a table-top chemistry set, with pipes carrying migrants to multiple outlet beakers strategically placed to minimise the loss to British interests.

To be sure, some MPs resisted the push to subsidise empire migration, like Labour MP Henry Snell, who thought it was 'bad eugenics' to 'export of the best of our blood, the most virile of our population, […] devitalising, as it were, the most vital elements of our civilisation.'[29] But this socialist-eugenist-nationalist argument was drowned out in Parliament by an imperialist and racist-supremacist vision of Britain's 'blood' carried via the conduits of steamship and railway to spread throughout the Empire.

Supporters of the construction of this racialised imperialist chemistry set held some of the major offices of state in the inter-war decades, like Leo Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies between 1924 and 1929 (close ally of Lord Milner, anti-free trader and fulsome supporter of 'tariff reform').[30] Amery saw white mobility as the very glue that kept metropolitan Britain and its Empire together. This was part of a broader vision of 'Empire Development' that would combine sponsored emigration, tariffs and deficit spending. The Treasury was publicly ambivalent about the policy, seeking to balance between Empire Development, on the one hand, and free trade and minimal government, on the other. However, a secret Overseas Loans Committee was set up in 1925 to funnel capital out of Britain to the empire to spur economic development (Daunton, 2007, p. 20).[31] Amery was one of this policy's great champions, stating that '"we are pledged up to the hilt to a policy of Empire preference and Empire development and yet, whenever we come up against any opportunity of showing that we mean something by our declarations, we are told by the pundits that no differentiation is possible"' (Ibid: 18). He would have to wait until the 1930s to see some of his longed-for imperial tariffs and the transformation of the British economy in a decidedly imperialist direction.[32] On the matter of migration, though, one piece of the 'empire development' puzzle was in place by 1922.

As Amery explained a year later in the *Empire Review*, sponsored emigration had huge advantages both for Britain and for the Empire. 'Here are three-fourths of our total white population huddled together upon less than one-fiftieth of the area

available for their dwelling and working', he declaimed, invoking an image of British cities with their 'dingy, sunless streets and squalid courts […] where body and mind alike are stunted and atrophied for want of space'. Meanwhile, the Dominions held the remaining fourth of Britain's 'white population' (note the racialization of 'Britain's population' in Amery's telling) 'thinly scattered over vast spaces' and 'unable, for lack of mutual support, to make the most of the bounty which Nature so lavishly offers them'. 'We must', Amery wrote, 'send many millions more out to the Dominions to create the conditions under which those left behind can flourish and increase.'[33]

Population redistribution, economic development and anti-socialism were united in Amery's argument.[34] With protective tariffs and mass emigration, Amery thought that Britain's industrialised core would be able to develop itself more fully into a market for manufactured goods by trading raw materials from the settler colonies. And with migrants travelling in British ships, and using British loans, the 'invisible exports' of services and finance would accumulate by emigration. Amery expanded on this point at the annual luncheon of the British Imperial Council of Commerce at the Savoy Hotel in 1925, where he explained: 'One Australian or New Zealander is worth to this country, from the point of trade and development […] six hundred times as much as one Russian, one hundred times as much as a Chinaman, 20 times as much as an American, and many more times than the citizen of any European nation. (Applause).'[35]

Trade figures bear out Amery's emphasis on the importance of the settler empire. By 1928 the combined imports from the periphery of the emigration state to the core stood at 158 million pounds (second only to the US at 188 million, India and Burma stood at 64 million). Combined exports to Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand stood at 137 million, with India and Burma in second place at 87 million (Edgerton, 2018, p. 13). The share of trade in the settler colonies themselves saw Britain at the top of their tables (apart from Canada which always maintained close ties with the US—a fact that vexed generations of British imperialists) (Jacks, 2014). And this is just in terms of raw trade figures, which, Amery was at pains to point out, did not measure what he saw as the true worth of the settler colonies, which, on his estimation, had a multiplier effect of 20 times as much as US trade. It must also be underlined, if it was not already obvious from Amery's discussion above, how central a racist and demographic ideal of economics and geopolitics was in this era. Race was absolutely inseparable from almost all contemporary discussions of trade, geopolitics and defense.

According to this view, peopling the settler colonies with British migrants would help to address the uneven development of British capitalism, solve the postwar slump, strengthen the diasporic British race and pierce the 'social question' of urban organised politics and potential socialist revolution. To Amery, what would later be called the 'gravity model' of international trade, whereby short distances drive market integration, did not, or, rather, should not, hold. Imperialism, military might, and subsidised migration bent and warped British trade such that it flowed unevenly through the world system away from Europe, pooling in a British imperial system under its own gravitational force.[36] To the imperialists at the peak of British politics, these forces needed to be magnified rather than diminished or the whole imperial edifice would come tumbling down. Subsidised emigration was the crucial tie that would bind the whole thing together.

The Empire Settlement Act's actual effects on either Britain's unemployment rate or on economic growth in the Dominions are hard to gauge, and were likely minimal (Drummond, 1974, pp. 137–144). Regardless, the policy betokened a moment of imperial self-strengthening, tying metropolitan Britain with firmer bonds to its settler Empire and with great effects on British politics. This was a process that political scientists would call 'policy feedback', whereby particular policies create conditions of increasing returns and durable structures that constrain and guide future action (Pierson, 1992). To use another term of art from political science, we might say that the years 1919–1922 constituted a 'critical juncture' (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). At this worldwide moment of reassessment and reordering of the world's politics, UK politicians pivoted towards the Empire rather than towards a national economy and a national conception of citizenship, as some other European states did (especially in eastern Europe). In this sense, British history between 1850 and the 1970s should not be narrated as a solely 'national' story. Centring the settler colonies within the wider 'Angloworld' is a crucial next step in explaining the particular social, cultural and economic connections situating Britain in relation to its empire state.

In the inter-war years Amery was not the only important figure in Britain intensifying policy feedback to form stronger ties with the Dominions: he was one outrider amongst a network of imperialist press barons, politicians and intellectuals aiming to reshape British politics in a decidedly imperialist direction. In the inter-war years they drew ideas (like subsidised

empire migration) from the margins of Victorian politics into core Conservative and then cross-Party policies. Even the liberal *Economist* magazine was writing by 1932 that the ‘continuous infusion of blood is also vital to the interests of British trade’.[37] In this sense, the 1922 Act stands, I would argue, as a significant event in Britain's modern history, implanting what Bernard Semmel (1960) termed ‘social imperialism’ deep into the heart of the British state.[38] Taken together with the various Aliens Acts passed between 1905 and 1920, the structure of Britain's emigration state—that sought to grease the wheels of white mobility and restrict non-white migration—was emerging into view in an age when great power competition and increasing capitalist crises saw successive British governments more actively intervene in migration control as a tool of economic, social and foreign policy.

The British were not alone in reimagining the relationship between population, race, space and ‘blood’ in the first half of the twentieth century. Amery's ideas were one part of what Alison Bashford (2014) explains was a widespread global debate about the fate of empires, nations and ‘races’ in the ‘closed world’ of competition over food, resources and living space. In the USA, for instance, the sociologist Edward Alsworth Ross spoke of a growing concern amongst US and British thinkers that only a sixth of the world's population “ ‘ have their population under control’ ”. The result, he feared, would be mass emigration from the poor countries to the rich ones. Ross told how northwest Europeans had sustained mass emigration in the nineteenth century but predicted that in the coming age Asians and Africans would be on the move. This, thought Ross, would force “ ‘the advanced peoples […] in sheer selfdefense to bar out mass immigration’ ” (Ibid: 123). With new statistics on birth rates and the massed data of the new sciences of population in hand, many politicians and intellectuals foresaw the fate of the planet as either a zero-sum game of imperialist expansion or of internationalist management of resources (Amery was firmly in the former camp).

Managing migration was thus of central importance in contemporary visions of global population and global politics and British debates about demographics united discussions about nation and the Empire right through to the 1960s and 1970s: you could not think one without the other (Thane, 1999).[39] This is because emigration remained a central part of the way demography was discussed well into the 1960s: the Empire Settlement Act was rolled over from 1922 right through to 1967, when the Labour government's Secretary of —State for Commonwealth Affairs, Herbert Bowden, proposed a renewal of the Act for five more years with no discussion or debate recorded in Hansard.[40] The period in between saw uneven support for emigration, however. The 1930s, in particular, were a difficult time for emigration's boosters as a global depression affected wage differentials between the UK and the Dominions; the number emigrating dropped considerably (Richards, 2004, pp. 347–350). But during the Second World War mass emigration still gained the support of the UK government and during the War and afterwards Clement Attlee sought to reinvigorate the policy (Constantine, 1998, p. 179). Ideologies of emigration may even have intensified in the war's wake, with vocal support from Australia, New Zealand and Canada, whose governments supported assisted passage schemes and whose immigration policies maintained ‘whites only’ policies into the 1970s in Australia's case and in New Zealand's case into the 1980s, with British immigrants privileged over other Europeans (ibid; Constantine, 2003; Hopkins, 2008).

From the 1950s it was these Commonwealth countries doing more of the ‘pulling’ of British migrants to the settler Commonwealth than the government at Westminster was ‘pushing’. But a focus on high politics might hide the level of commitment to emigration amongst what Helen McCarthy and Pat Thane call the ‘governing institutions’ of NGOs and voluntary societies in Britain (McCarthy & Thane, 2011). In the case of assisted passage for child migrants, for example, the late 1940s saw a resurgence of support from government and charities (although enthusiasm for unaccompanied child emigration quickly dwindled at the end of the 1950s) (Boucher, 2014, Ch. 5). Throughout the immediate postwar years the Church of England sought to boost Anglican emigration to the settler Commonwealth, too (Stockwell, 2021).[41] Amongst the wider British public, support for emigration to the Commonwealth remained high, with successive polls revealing that between 30 and 40% of respondents expressed a desire to settle in another country, most favouring Australia up to the 1970s (Constantine, 1990, p. 1). At the level of politics, economics and demography, as well as in the recesses of individual consciousness, emigration formed one part of the the social and psychic structure of modern Britain (Darwin, 2010, p. 394; Schwarz, 2011).

Part of emigration's wideranging effects on British society after 1945 came from the fact that it had been such a longstanding and mass cultural and socialphenomenon. On the chart below, the blue bars represent annual outbound

passenger numbers. This suggests that annual emigration numbers never again reached the heights of 1900–1910, however the 1950s and 1960s were roughly analogous to the 1880s and 1890s. And as the 1950s and 1960s saw more migrants going to live in white settler states within the British Commonwealth than the USA, emigration had become more 'imperial', than in the late nineteenth century: between 1881 and 1890 only 28% of emigrants went to Empire destinations; between 1901 and 1913 that number shot up to 64% and then climbed upwards: to 71% between 1920 and 1929 and 74% between 1946–1949 (Harper & Constantine, 2010; Smith, 2021, pp. 255–259) (Figure 2).

The orange line on the chart above represents total outbound passenger numbers, but it can also be read as a rough stand in for the intensification of the UK's emigration state up to the 1960s. It was in the 1970s, and rather suddenly, according to A.G. Hopkins, that the settler Commonwealth recalculated its affinities with the UK as politicians realised that the imminent Europeanisation of British patterns of migration would lead to what they



F I G U R E 2 Annual (on left axis) and cumulative (on right axis) outbound passenger numbers between 1850 and 1980 (in 1000 s). *Source*: Mitchell, 1992, pp. 128, 132, 135 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

imagined as a racial/demographic crisis (Hopkins, 2008, p. 244). The 1960s/70s, therefore, saw the waning of the emigration state in its imperial phase, a point that I return to in part 3 of this essay and in its conclusion.

Taken as a whole, the 50 years from 1922 to 1972 (when the money for the Empire Settlement Act was left unrenewed for the first time and the UK joined the EEC a year later), represents an era when policy makers in Whitehall (as well as their allies in non-governmental 'governing institutions') actively sought to drive and direct migrants from metropolitan Britain towards the settler Commonwealth and, as we will see below, then subsequently to endow these migrants and their descendants with rights to metropolitan citizenship in a number of key pieces of legislation. It might be helpful to think of the development of this policy as a matter of 'path dependence' (Pierson, 2000), rather than of constant conscious support.[42] However, this might give the impression that there was something inevitable about the formation of Britain's emigration state. In fact, it took key decisions at key moments to construct the legal architecture of the emigration state.

A conjunctural account fits better with the narrative told so far. What William Sewell calls an 'eventful sociology' captures how a series of critical junctures led to the formation of the UK's emigration state (Sewell, 2005, Ch. 3, pp. 100–101). To reiterate the narrative told so far: the nineteenth century saw the emergence of the 'mass transfer' of emigrants to the USA and Britain's settler colonies, a phenomenon that James Belich explains was itself the result of military and economic causes. Subsequent policy decisions proceeded in the wake of these geopolitical and economic structures. In the aftermath of both World Wars, UK governments retrenched and deepened the ties between the UK and Dominions: decisions that in turn structured the emerging emigration state and, as we shall see in the final section of this article, subsequent nationality laws.

This eventful history of emigration provides one way in which the British citizenship was racialised between 1850 and 1971, with longstanding consequences for the 'Windrush generation' and for Britain's relationship with the EEC/EU.

Before getting to that part of my argument, I need to explain another key set of structures and events: how the positive vision of white-settler primacy was founded simultaneously on an exclusionary migration regime that blocked differently racialised subjects of empire. As we shall see, the vision of white supremacists like Amery was contested by imperial subjects, especially from India, who claimed that their subject position as imperial citizens gave them a right to freely trans-migrate across the Empire, just like the migrants transiting from the UK to Canada or Australia. If we are to explain the open-ended and eventful, rather than the overdetermined and teleological, relationship between racism and migration control we need to go back again to the nineteenth century and run forward the history of intra-imperial migrations from the 19th century by turning our attention to the other principal migratory routes through the British Empire: the mobility of South and East Asian migrants, often under indenture.

ASIAN RESTRICTION AND THE BIRTH OF THE WHITE MAN'S WORLD

In the first section this essay I suggested that Tara Zahra's metaphor of emigration as a teapot with evaporating steam was better replaced with an image of Britain's emigration state as an apparatus connecting a heated flask (the UK) by condensers and pipes to various outlet beakers (the settler colonies). So far I have provided a
'positive' vision of this emigration state by explaining how emigration became, in time, a means by which the British state subsidised white mobility in aid of its global and imperial power. In the second part of this essay, I will argue that Britain's emigration state was also constructed in a way that blocked the mobility of racialised others. Citizenship, after all, is grounded simultaneously in inclusion and in exclusion; boundaries are maintained to categorise those who belong, those who don't and those who the law claims can be legitimately expelled from the political community (Bhambra, 2015; Tilly, 1998, pp. 93–94). Blocking Black and Asian migration in the British Empire and sponsoring white mobility were two sides of the same coin. Or, to extend the metaphor of the imperialist chemistry apparatus with its flasks and beakers, Britain's emigration state channelled migrants out of Britain while simultaneously redirecting or blocking off other conduits connecting India, in particular, to colonies of white settlement.

This process began soon after emancipation in the British Empire in 1833 and the waning of the system of 'apprenticeship', which saw former slaves working on their ex-masters' plantations for five more years until 1837/ 38. The £ 20,000,000 raised to compensate the 'owners' of these men and women was the biggest single expenditure after 1815 laid out by the 19th century British state, allowing former slave owners to reinvest their money, often in imperialist ventures. This provided, Kris Manjapra (2019) argues, a proto-Keynesian 'great financial stimulus program for the British Empire' (p. 36). In the wake of emancipation, a regime of so-called 'free labour' emerged and South and East Asian labourers moved in huge numbers to replace enslaved labour across the coastal regions of the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Ocean worlds, often under forms of indenture.[43]

This process stretched long-established Asian migrant networks further afield and it led to the regulation and suppression of merchant-led and sub-imperial networks across the Indian Ocean by agents of the British Empire (McKeown, 2011, pp. 57–62.; Amrith, 2011). The result was the emergence of a new 'plantation complex' that drew principally South and East Asian labourers across the zone that runs between the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn, where workers brought land into cultivation and capital and contracts secured the export of raw materials for the second industrial revolution of 1860s-1890s: rubber for tyres and bullets, jute for sacks that contained other commodities like coffee, tea, sugar, and the gutta-percha that went into the telegraph cabling stretching across the globe (Manjapra, 2018).

The nineteenth-century British Empire was transformed by the emergence of the 'Angloworld', discussed in part 1 of this essay, and by the post-emancipation plantation complex discussed in this section. These two zones were underpinned by a migration regime that formed the two sides of what I am calling Britain's emigration state. These great migrations drove settler colonialism and plantation agriculture and both were quickened by finance capitalism (Offer, 1989, pp. 141–42; Amrith, 2011, pp. 27–31; Lester & Vanderbyl, 2020). Thus, while it is important to centre imperial politics in the formation of these

differentiated zones of Britain's empire, a growing, globalising economy was also a primary cause (McKeown, 2011, p. 52). Yet while finance capital drove migration from the UK to the settler colonies and from South and East Asia to the plantation complex, two different spacializations of land and labour grew up on capitalism's restive global frontiers. Migration controls, ideas about race and climate and capitalist relations of production quickened the distinction between, on the one hand, settler-capitalist expansion and, on the other, a pointillist plantation frontier of dense extractive industry in the 'tropics'.

Attempts to steer, direct and fix two administratively differentiated flows of white settlers and Asian indentured labourers led to the foundation of the centrally-coordinated Colonial Land and Emigration Commission, which existed until 1878 (Zolberg, 2010, pp. 48–49). Meanwhile, in the settler empire, politicians of European descent and trades unions began to form a white identity politics that fulminated against the landing of Chinese and South Asian labourers, whether indentured or freely moving as private passengers (Hyslop, 1999). This meant that Chinese and South Asian free and indentured migrants were increasingly penned within the 'plantation complex' and not allowed to enter the 'temperate' settler empire. This politics of exclusion and the growing discussion of 'self-government' in the settler colonies led many late-Victorian Britons to see their Empire as two distinct spheres: an empire of 'self-governing' settler colonies and the 'dependent' colonies of differentially racialised subject peoples (Behm, 2015).

As older ideas of 'Greater Britain' waned, an ideology of settler nationalism grew up in the new 'Dominions'. The settler colonies began to be understood by imperialists as a 'family of nations' rather than as subaltern outposts of British imperial power (Heere, 2017: 599). This reimagining of the Dominions as independent nations has had a curious historiographical effect. While, as we have seen in the first part of this article, the Dominions were absolutely central to ideals of Englishness, Britishness and an emergent 'imperial ethnicity' the settler empire barely figures in most histories of modern Britain, even in the 'new imperial history', which tends to focus on the coconstitution of the UK with its empire when writing 'beyond the nation' (Burton, 1997).[44] The sense that the 'self-governing' colonies were even part of the British Empire has all but disappeared in much historiography, like so much steam evaporating out of a teapot (to riff on Tara Zahra's metaphor again). This is something which historians of the so-called 'British World' have been seeking to address for decades.[45]

This bifurcation of the Empire between 'self-governing' and 'dependent' colonies has historical and, as we have seen, historiographical roots. The splitting of the empire into two distinct zones of political rule—dependence and self-government—was justified often with historical narratives about identity and migration from the 'mother country', Britain. As part of a process of transitioning to so-called 'self -government' as part of a 'family of nations', legislators in Australasia, South Africa and North America increasingly endowed European migrants with value as 'whites' in contrast to South and East Asian migrants (Lake & Reynolds, 2008).[46] To the Australian Premier, Alfred Deakin, the British Empire was and should be a 'white Empire' (Heere, 2017, p. 599). But this explicit avowal of white racial supremacy chafed with British imperial economic policies which relied on the movement of both Asian and European migrants within the Empire. A decade previously, justifications for blocking Asian migrants from the settler colonies had transitioned to 'educational' criteria based on literacy tests, after the strenuous efforts of the arch-imperialist Joseph Chamberlain to influence the rhetoric of migration control. Chamberlain noted that the racism of the settler-colonial colour bar was stoking resentment amongst British subjects in India and that blocking Japanese migration on the basis that they were an 'inferior race' would put the Empire's new naval alliances with Japan in peril (Atkinson, 2016, pp. 21–22). To Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India from 1899 to 1905, the British Empire must retain its Indocentric orientation and resist calls for immigration restrictions in the settler colonies, or risk losing its empire *tout court* (Heere, 2017, p. 604).

Yet as Governor General of Australia Lord Northcote reported in 1906: 'the feeling here is that Englishmen don't appreciate Australia's difficulties in dealing with coloured races; which can never swamp Great Britain, but which might swamp Australia' (Ibid: 595). In South Africa, where different visions of Britain's empire and its racial hierarchies clashed especially forcefully at the turn of the century, Lionel Curtis wrote to Leo Amery that, if left unchecked, 'the lower races will overrun Canada, Australia and South Africa [and] if the British Empire means handing over the balance of the habitable globe to Asiatics, it is a vast mistake'. The British would have to 'teach the Indian population to think their future is in Asia' (Ibid: 599, 602). In this sense, Amery and Curtis thought that incipient nationalism in India should be combined with restrictive

mobility, while in the 'white Dominions' free movement for UK-origin migrants and white nationalism would 'solve' fears of racial degeneration and imperial decline.

This led to significant intra-imperial tension. Curtis and Amery's arguments posed serious problems for those seeking to balance the interests of what Deakin called the 'white empire' with the position taken by those like Lord Curzon who prioritised 'Indocentrism'. Because of this, some at the peak of the imperial hierarchy in Whitehall worried that migration control would ultimately be the rock that would break the British Empire. As an author writing under the pseudonym 'Viator' explained in the *Fortnightly Review*, exclusion of South Asians from the settler colonies, '"may create the political unity of India and the fighting unity of Asia"': 'a pan-Asian mirror' the historian Cees Heere explains, to 'the 'white man's world'" (Ibid: 606). For these reasons many British bureaucrats and imperialists used universalist and 'liberal' language to describe imperial bonds of belonging. British imperialists normally avoided white supremacist arguments precisely because they wanted to maintain their violent control over diverse populations. British politicians and bureaucrats worried that naming outright the white supremacy of their empire would stoke Indian nationalism beyond breaking point (Ibid; Atkinson, 2016). Their hesitancy in vocalising their support for migration control did not come from a disavowal of their white supremacist 'kith and kin' in the Dominions, but from their fear that an anti-colonial backlash was brewing, especially among nationalist and diasporic South Asians. They worried that avowing white supremacism would fuel the growth of other 19th-century transnationalisms that were emerging alongside and against 'Greater Britain': pan-Africanism, pan-Asianism and panIslamism, often invoked by their theorists explicitly in opposition to white-settler transnationalism (Younis, 2017).

Thus Joseph Chamberlain clung to the so-called 'Natal formula', named after the colony in South Africa where it was formulated, of forcing Asians landing in settler colonies to take literacy and language tests as less overt means of explicitly barring them on racial grounds (arriving migrants had to write in a European language, although which language was left up to the discretion of the immigration officers, offering the opportunity to almost guarantee deportation if desired). In Canada, from 1907, the authorities tried to institute a passport system to restrict Indian migration and from 1908 lawmakers developed a policy whereby only those who had arrived via "continuous passage"—that is, embarking on a ship that sailed directly to Canada without transiting at another port—would be able to land. The Canadians then ensured that no private companies would offer such continuous passage. These policies were designed to limit South Asian migration and to work around the fact that Indians, just like Canadians and just like Britons, were subjects of the Crown (Mongia, 2018, Ch. 4). Combined with increasingly heavy 'head taxes' that demanded the payment of cash lump sums on a migrant's arrival it was becoming, by the First World War, almost impossible except for the very wealthiest South Asians and the most literate in European languages to freely migrate to Britain's settler colonies.

These tensions between claims for universal imperial subjecthood and racist differentiation played out dramatically in 1914 when Gurdit Singh chartered the *Komagata Maru* to sail from Hong Kong to Vancouver with Indian passengers onboard. When the ship arrived, the immigration authorities blocked almost all the passengers from disembarking. The Indians appealed to King George V and after months left in the harbour with dwindling stocks of food, took over the ship and sought to force the authorities to allow them to land. After raining iron bars and supplies on a boat that tried to board, and with reports of shots fired, the *Komagata Maru* was eventually forced to leave Vancouver harbour under escort by the HMCS *Rainbow* and return to Bengal, before the passengers were transported by train to the Punjab. A more dramatic and public realisation of the global colour line could not have been possible (Atkinson, 2016, pp. 136–142; Mongia, 2018, pp. 132–135).

These fierce contests over migration, organised labour and imperial geopolitics made British officials masters of 'the art of writing race-neutral terms into legislation which would nevertheless produce racialised effects', writes Nadine El-Enany (2020, p. 72). And, as we shall see in the final section of this essay: 'apparently race-neutral but in fact racist methods of restriction developed in the colonial context would be adopted to target the movement of 'undesirable' aliens to Britain and, later, racialised colony and Commonwealth citizens' (Ibid: 45). In Britain, migration legislation was written into statute from the Aliens Act of 1905 onwards in a similar pattern to its settler colonies (Bashford & Gilchrist, 2012). But it was the postwar legislation of the 1960s and 1970s that completed the 'Dominionification' of the UK, fatefully severing itself from members of formerly 'dependent' colonies, while protecting the free movement and access to citizenship for white emigrants and their descendants.

FROM COMMONWEALTH CITIZENS TO ALIEN IMMIGRANTS

When Siebert Allman travelled to the UK from Barbados in 1961 to work for London Transport he framed his experience in terms of mass emigration: 'we heard that jobs were vacant because English people were leaving their own country to go to Australia and New Zealand' (quoted in Harper & Constantine, 2010, p. 189). Allman returned to Barbados a year later, before travelling to London again in 1963 to work on his old bus routes: the 43 and the 143. In the interim, the government passed the Commonwealth Immigration Act, implementing a voucher scheme to limit the free movement of Commonwealth citizens who were not actively recruited or who did not have a 'skill'. Allman remembers entering a much more hostile country in 1963. Regulars on his bus routes who had previously been friendly now shunned him and he recalled a spike in racist abuse. After a few miserable months he returned to Barbados, before departing for Canada in 1968, where he settled with his wife Aileen (Gmelch, 1992, pp. 208–209).

How should we think of the political geography of Allman's migration to Britain in 1961 and in 1963? And, more generally, how does postwar migration from the Commonwealth to Britain fit into the tale told so far? Postwar migrants from the so-called 'New Commonwealth' (a new idiom that mapped broadly onto racialised late-Victorian notions of the 'dependent' empire) like Allman were not the first Black and Caribbean migrants to Britain.[47] Nor were they the first migrants to receive racist treatment from the state and from the British public. Irish and Jewish migrants, especially if they were working class, faced varying degrees of social ostracism, xenophobia, violence and exclusion (Holmes, 1988, pp. 56–84; Panayi, pp. 222–227). And while they might have been officially subjects of the Crown and not foreign 'aliens', non-white subjects of empire had long been threatened with exclusion and deportation, too. Whether imperial citizens or not, strict laws were put in place to prevent Arab, East African, South and Southeast Asian sailors (known colloquially as 'lascars') disembarking in Britain, regardless of their place of birth (Harper and Constantine, 184). Many did leave their ships, though, and small communities of sailors and working-class migrants lived mainly in London and port towns, as well as in some inland cities, such as Sheffield (Holland, 2017, 2019).

Hostility to these sailors seems to have tracked a general uptick in anti-'alien' prejudice after the 1880s (often directed at East-European Jews), when jingoism increased amid anxiety about Britain's relative imperial decline and Great Power competition with Germany (Tabili, 2006). The result was the 1905 Aliens Act that was often justified on antisemitic grounds by politicians and public speakers and that drew for its framing on extensive engagement with exemplars drawn from US and Dominions' migration laws (Bashford & Gilchrist, 2012; Cesarani, 1992; Holmes, 1988, p. 65). The subsequent internment of tens of thousands of Germans and Austrians in wartime, the deportation of many of them postwar and 'anti-alien' riots in 1919 saw widespread street violence meted out against ethnic minorities throughout Britain (Cesarani, 1987, 1992; On internment: Panayi, 2020; On postwar violence: Evans, 1994; Jenkinson, 2019). The inter-war years seem to have witnessed an intensification of state racism. The Coloured Aliens Seamen Order of 1925, for instance, racialised a whole host of different groups as 'Black' or 'coloured', making 'racial difference itself prima facie alien status' (Tabili, 1994, p. 71). Anthropological studies from the 1940s give a clear demonstration of Britain's racist housing market, which, along with a racist labour market, spurred the activism of the Jamaican-born doctor Harold Moody to form the League of Coloured Peoples in 1931 in order to challenge the domestic 'colour bar' by appealing to notions of Christian morality, 'British fair play' and imperial citizenship (Killingray, 2018; Little, 1943; Rush, 2002).

From one point of view, things improved for Black and Asian Britons in 1948, when the British Nationality Act opened the possibility for all subjects of the British Empire with a UK and Colonies Passport to work and reside in the UK, regardless of ethnicity or place of birth (Perry, 2015, p. 49- 50). But this right to live and work in Britain did not make provision for the full social citizenship that its racist society structurally impeded (many workplaces barred non-white workers, as did many pubs and lodging houses) (Perry, 2015; Wetherell, 2020). In fact, to think of the Act as having anything to do with immigration at all is to misinterpret the reason why it was passed. The Act resulted from a desire to defend the rights of white Britons to emigrate to the Commonwealth, not for non-white imperial citizens to come to the UK; it was designed to trump Canadian attempts at creating their own national rather than Commonwealth-wide citizenship (Hansen, 1999). The unintended consequence was to offer the 'Windrush generation' the same rights of entry as Commonwealth 'emigrants' had to reside in Canada and Australia. Tens of thousands of Commonwealth citizens made a journey to Britain under its protections and

created a politics of claims-making on its terms (Perry, 2015, 2018). The claims they made and the rights they won had to be extracted, they were not conceded.

We can see the pro-emigration values that actually underwrote the 1948 British Nationality Act by seeing how it was enforced and subsequently amended. Very few parliamentarians had any idea that they were creating an open door for immigration from the Empire, with some minimal mention of the theory but no discussion of the consequences (El-Enany, 2020, p. 80). Meanwhile, records of conversations amongst Labour ministers about the landing of the *HMT Empire Windrush* reveal shock and dismay at the fact that non-white imperial citizens were claiming a right to reside in Britain (Joshi & Carter, 1984). The Cabinet demanded that extra-legal policies be implemented to ' "discourage these influxes" ' and a civil servant was despatched to Jamaica to ' "discourage people from coming over" ' (quoted in Paul, 1992, p. 457). A huge amount of administrative effort went in to trying to stem non-white mobility, resulting in various 'ad hoc' measures, from slowing down passport applications in issuing colonies and countries to devising ways to deport 'overseas citizens'(Carter et al., 1987). By the 1950s a number of government departments were pushing for legal restrictions to exclude imperial citizens on the basis of colour discrimination (ibid: 3).

Ministers and Parliamentarians were aware of the extra labour needed for postwar reconstruction, but they tended to favour the recruitment either of Irish citizens (defined in 1948 after the Republic left the Commonwealth as 'neither subjects nor aliens') or of 'aliens' from Europe over the 'New Commonwealth' citizens with UK and Colonies passports (except in a few very constrained industries) (Paul, 1997; Ryan, 2020, pp. 288–290).[48] As the British bureaucrats sorted amongst immigrant communities for what they considered to be more desirable forms of workers, subsidised emigration to the Commonwealth continued with tens and hundreds of thousands of migrants being sent out over the next decade, with the Empire Settlement Act (passed back in 1922 to subsidise emigration and later renamed the Commonwealth Settlement Bill) rolled over two more times.

Alongside this continued support for emigration, the administrative measures put in place to block non-white Commonwealth citizens were supplemented by new legislation in the form of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. This law instituted a work voucher scheme to limit supposedly 'unskilled' labour from the Commonwealth (but provided a loophole for Irish citizens, a fact that was seized upon by critics of the government to suggest that the legislation reflected a desire for a racist colour bar) (Ryan, 2020, pp. 292–294). This argument was made by Liberal Party leader Clement Davies in Parliament:

> the Government may assert and reassert until they are black in the face that this is not intended as a colour bar, but nobody will believe them. Nobody in India, Pakistan and the West Indies will believe them. Nobody throughout Africa will believe them. (Vigneswaran, 2020, p. 14)

Labour Leader, Hugh Gaitskell, drew an analogy between the law and the apartheid government in South Africa, "I am sure that the Nationalists in South Africa will be rubbing their hands and saying, "You see, even the British are beginning to learn at last"' (ibid: 15).

This 1962 Act can be seen as a first step in an increasingly restrictive, reactive process of limitation, drawing an ever-narrower circle around Britishness as imperial citizenship gave way to a 'national' conception of the UK. As Anne Dummett and Andrew Nicol write in their landmark study *Subjects, Citizens, Aliens, Others* (1990), 1962 opened a 'breach' in British nationality 'which was to be widened by each successive immigration statute' (p. 188).

But what happens if we see the places Siebert Allman talked of (Australia, New Zealand, Barbados and Britain) trans-nationally, rather in a 'methodologically nationalist' model? What if we follow Hugh Gaitskell's lead and compare Britain's migration policy to apartheid, with the implication that the roots of British legislation lie in the history of settler colonialism and the global colour line? Does the 1962 Act seem, then, like a turning point from the story told in the first two parts of this essay? Does the brief open door to residence for Commonwealth migrants after 1948 seem so 'intriguing', as Randall Hanson wrote? (Hansen, 2000, p. 6)? Or does it mark an unintentional blip amidst a broad continuity of non-white exclusion and subsidised white emigration?

With our analysis now attuned to an empire-wide migration regime, long settled assumptions about the development of migration policy in postwar Britain as a tightening of restrictions driven solely with immigration in mind can be seen in a new

light. Rather than see the 1940s to 1970s as an era of 'mass immigration', with our sights on exit as well as entry we notice that between 1948 and 1972 roughly 1.5 million more people exited than entered the country (Mitchell, 1992, pp. 132, 135). When the 1962 Act was passed, not only was net migration running on balance at an outward loss of 23,200 people, but the Commonwealth 'immigrants' who were the targets of this legislation were not 'immigrants' at all but often holders of UK and Colonies passports.[49] The migration and citizenship legislation that followed, in 1968 and 1971 and beyond, need now to be seen as a series of attempts to triangulate between the purported contradiction that sought to secure free movement for emigrants travelling out of the UK, while seeking ways to block 'New Commonwealth' immigration travelling to the UK, without prejudicing the rights of returning emigrants. Of course, some New Commonwealth migrants were sponsored to work in Britain. But of those who were recruited, like nurses into the NHS and drivers and conductors into London Transport, many had their passage paid on the expectation that they would be brief sojourners in Britain or would return to the Caribbean after training to aid Commonwealth development (Harper and Constantine, 193; Peach, 1991, pp. 8–9).

In light of the preceding analysis of Canadian histories of exclusion, the 1962 visa quota system looks remarkably similar to the proposed passport ordinances of 1907 and 1908. Meanwhile, the refusal to officially cite 'race' or 'colour' in legislation, while legislators discussed exactly these issues in Parliament and in the Cabinet looks like Joseph Chamberlain's 'Natal Formula'. Recall, too, that Lord Northcote had said, sympathetically, in 1906 that 'the feeling here is that Englishmen don't appreciate Australia's difficulties in dealing with coloured races; which can never swamp Great Britain, but which might swamp Australia' (Heere, 2017, p. 595). Fifty years later civil servants in the Home Office and politicians in Westminster and Whitehall shared an increasing sense that Great Britain might soon be 'swamped' by the 'coloured races' and that imperial, rather than national, citizenship was enabling this process.

A 1954 letter written by government ministers Robert Gascoyne-Cecil to Philip Cunliffe-Lister suggests as much and reveals how policy makers looked to the 'white Dominions' for inspiration for the design of racist border policies that segmented notionally equal forms of imperial citizenship. Gascoyne-Cecil (at the time Lord President of the Council) wrote about limiting 'the inflow of Blacks' by 'approximat[ing] our legislation to that already in operation in Canada, Australia and New Zealand.'[50] At a meeting of the Cabinet nine months later it was agreed that the public might support such controls if it was explained that racist colour bars already existed in the settler Commonwealth. So the Commonwealth Secretary (Cunliffe-Lister) and Colonial Secretary (Alan Lennox-Boyd) were invited 'to prepare and submit to the Cabinet the draft of a White Paper describing the existing restrictions on the entry of British subjects into other Commonwealth countries' in preparation for a public information campaign.[51] Yet Cunliffe-Lister urged that '[a]s regards the form of the proposed legislation […] its provisions should be kept as general as possible in order that means might be found in practice to allow the movement of British subjects between the United Kingdom and independent Commonwealth countries to continue without hindrance.'[52] In other words, the structure of the emigration state must be maintained: to block non-white migrants from entering the UK while not prejudicing the ability of UK citizens to enter other Commonwealth states. This was a balancing act that subsequent governments would all try to maintain.

In light of these Cabinet-level discussions, we need to recast the 'breach' (to use Dummett and Nicol's term) in the UK's migration regime and citizenship laws that occurred in 1962. The breach was not a division between a national Britain and its empire, but between Britain's emigration state and the Black and Asian migrants that it had tried to exclude since the 1880s. In the 1960s, however, the 'breach' was being written into law at the 'source' of the emigration state, in the UK, rather than at the 'outlets', in the settler colonies, meaning that the colour line would soon cut through the metropole at its centre, shearing the non-white Commonwealth from the settler colonies and also now from the metropole itself: this was the end of the previously fraught balance that held from the late Victorian era between Dominion racial nationalism and 'Indocentrism'.[53] The emergence of a 'national' citizenship in the UK after 1962 tried to keep a minimal citizenship for the settler Commonwealth based on ties of 'blood'. This process fits remarkably well with Radhika Mongia's (2018) argument about the birth of settler nations in the Edwardian era. In the UK, however, nationality would be defined not only as territorial– bounded by the United Kingdom- but also in terms of ancestry and mobility—by protecting the promise of 'patrial' citizenship for those who chose, and had chosen in the past, to emigrate. This process—clinging to the capillaries of the emigration state, while shearing off the 'dependents'—would be made clearer still in the ensuing 'East African Asian crisis'.

In 1967 Kenya passed the Kenya Immigration Act. This law required Kenyans of Asian origin living in the diaspora to apply for Kenyan citizenship. Many of these now 'foreign' Kenyans wanted to leave and many sought to move to the UK. Under the 1962 Immigration Act these 'Kenyan Asians' would not be subject to immigration controls in Britain as they were citizens of the UK and Colonies. Furthermore, their passports were issued by the British High Commission in Kenya making them the same as those issued directly by the United Kingdom government (Dummett & Nicol, 1990, p. 199). But the possibility that these men and women might move to Britain in their tens, possibly hundreds, of thousands led grandees in both the Labour and Conservative parties to seek constitutional work-arounds to strip them of their citizenship rights (ibid, pp. 200–202). In 1968 the Commonwealth Immigrants Act provided 'that a British subject would be free from control only if he, or at least one of his parents or grandparents, was born, adopted, registered or naturalised in the United Kingdom' (ibid, pp. 202–203). This made the East African Asians who had not registered as Kenyan citizens stateless and a number of migrants took the government to court for breaking international law (ibid: 230; Cosemans, 2021). On this matter of prioritising white migration over Asian migration, even in possible contravention of international law, James Callaghan, Roy Jenkins, Duncan Sandys and Enoch Powell all concurred (Dummett & Nicol, 1990, pp. 200–201).

Thus, as the 1960s wore on, "the universalist pretensions of the 'Commonwealth family'" in the UK foundered on successive race-based restrictions (Dubow, 2017; Nasar, 2020). Vague appeals to a 'Commonwealth ideal' ended up as little more than a rhetorical smokescreen, barely covering the longstanding exclusions of Britain's emigration state. This had an impact at the centre as well as at the fringes of the emigration state. In Australia, for instance, government and public opinion turned on the UK for threating to change their status from most-favoured migrants to a general 'Commonwealth' population or, worse, into 'aliens' (with all the racist allusions within Australia's own history blowing back into an identity crisis) (Beale, 2011). With anxiety in the former Dominions and with impending accession to the European Economic Community, the British government were forced to clarify the changes to British citizenship law made since 1948: would the last remnants of non-white imperial citizens have a right to move to other European countries in the EEC? And should men and women in the white-settler Commonwealth be blocked by immigration controls like the East African Asians? Unsurprisingly, given what we now know about the resilience of the emigration state, the answer to these questions in the 1971 Immigration Act and its amendments in 1973 was: 'no'.

A new definition of 'patriality' linked British citizenship to the birthplace of parents and grandparents (Williams, 2015). The reasoning was clear to a writer in the *Sydney Morning Herald* who explained in 1972: 'not many Pakistanis of course, had grandparents from Yorkshire or the Highlands' (Beale, 2011, p. 54). This new political geography of 'patriality' created a notion of citizenship based on blood and territory fixed to those born in Britain and also to their white-settler descendants, making immanent one prevalent strand of imperial 'Britishness' that harked back to the Victorian and Edwardian ideas of Greater Britain and to Leo Amery: a Britishness that was *not* empire-wide but articulated through emigration and white transnationalism.

If the 1971 Act raised the geographical drawbridge around British citizenship, the 1981 British Nationality Act barred the gate shut around ancestry. This law clarified that the definition of 'patriality' included only those whose father or mother was a British citizen or had settled status. This had the effect of removing the automatic right for all those born in Britain to claim citizenship. A new clause detailing a 'good character' requirement was now needed to claim citizenship for those born in Britain to parents who were not citizens themselves. As Nadine El-Enany (2020) explains, these changes 'would fall primarily on racialised people' and they would finally sever British citizenship from historic ties to the 'dependent' empire (p. 127). The consequence of the 1971 and 1981 acts should be clear. To spell it out: the descendants of emigrants born in Australia or New Zealand up to two generations removed from anyone born in Britain could still claim British citizenship, while children born in Britain to Indian or Nigerian or Jamaican parents did not automatically qualify, unless of 'good character'.

In the midst of these tightening restrictions, 'Windrush migrants', like Sarah O'Connor, Hubert Howard, Richard (Wes) Stewart, Paulette Wilson, all of whom died before being paid compensation by the British government, had their citizenship status changed in ways that left them subject to the hostile environment that we can now relabel the 'emigration state'. The result has been an appalling travesty, known as the 'Windrush Scandal', which a recent report blamed on a 'culture of disbelief and carelessness' at the UK's Home Office (Williams, 2020, p. 7). At the same time, and coupled with the lifting of restrictions on Asian migration in the settler Commonwealth, new academic theorising about migration would emerge in the 1980s. These

debates centred on 'integration', human capital and cosmopolitanism, often in a 'methodologically nationalist' framework, treating the UK as if it was a nation state with a history of national citizenship. On this model, it was 'immigration' that drove the generation of postwar citizenship laws. As we have seen, this almost universally accepted argument does not hold empirical or conceptual weight. Without an appreciation of emigration's affects on statemaking we have a radically poorer account of the history of race, migration and citizenship in modern British history. By excluding emigration and centring immigration as a 'social problem' that restriction and assimilation would solve, government ministers and academics pulled a shroud over an era that had existed until only a decade before the 1980s: an era of both explicit and tacit white supremacy by which subsidised, state funded empire migration had structured Britain's transnational emigration state for at least the preceding five decades.

CONCLUSION

Almost 50 years ago, Albert Hirschman (1978) contrasted the negative view of emigration taken in twentiethcentury Ireland with the very different opinion of emigration in the UK, where exit was generally seen as both beneficial and unremarkable, concluding: 'we do not investigate whatever seems to be going well no matter how poorly we understand the underlying process' (p. 103).[54] Unlike in many other European nations, successive UK governments offered fulsome support and even subsidy to emigrants throughout much of the twentieth century. This article has offered an outline of the underlying processes driving emigration and detailed some of its effects. In particular, I have argued that the migration and citizenship laws of the 1960s, 70s and 80s clarified and made explicit the racialising effects of what I have called Britain's emigration state that emerged between the 1850s and 1970s. These policies made clear that the 'old' settler Commonwealth was deemed more crucial to policy makers' sense of 'Britishness' than the so-called 'new Commonwealth' and that legislators were willing to shear off forms of imperial citizenship associated with the latter—the rights of Kenyan and Ugandan Asians most dramatically—to suture settler ties of belonging via 'patriality'. This was of a piece with the longer history of the settler colonies' own processes of racist differentiation from Asian and Chinese migrations in the second half of the 19th century. From this perspective, 'decolonisation' in Britain meant the strengthening of white transnationalism via the 'Anglosphere' and then the only-ever partial reconstitution of British politics and society via the EEC/EU.[55] This latter development changed the terms of entry for non-patrial Commonwealth citizens, stoking resentment amongst many in Australia that they risked being treated as 'aliens' and passed over in favour of European migrants (Beale, 2011, p. 61). Opposition to the Europeanisation of Britain's migration regime, preexisting constitutional and legal definitions of citizenship and allegiance to the cultural and affective ties of the emigration state persisted beyond 1973, mostly on the Tory right and in Britain's print media, as well as in the former settler Colonies, via discussions of an 'Australian-style points system', CANZUK (CanadaAustraliaNewZealandUnitedKingdom), the Anglosphere etc, with longstanding consequences for contemporary British and global politics in the wake of Britain's decision to leave the EU (Bell & Vucetic, 2019).

Moving from contemporary politics back to the historiography of modern Britain, my argument here lends support to Bill Schwarz's provocation that England was 're-racialised' in the 1950s by the inscription of the settler frontier in postwar Britain (Schwarz, 1996). However, instead of seeing the racism of the 1950s principally as a response to what Schwarz calls, the 'peculiarly modern situation—the impact of mass immigration', I have argued that we look at the longer history of state-assisted emigration as well. The settler frontier had been expanded, after all, by exit. Drawing on new research on migration law allows us to entangle the history of emigration with the history of immigration and suggests that postwar racism was transnational, not national, immanent not reactive, and longstanding rather than novel.[56] For, by the 1950s, racism and the desire to restrict non-white migration had been part of the 'British World'—in Australian, Canadian and New Zealand's histories—for at least half a century prior. As David Atkinson (2016), Cees Heere (2017) and Radhika Mongia (2018), as well as others, have explained, the settler colonies' trans-imperial migration control had motivated and vexed British policy makers in Whitehall for just as long as they tried to balance affective ties to the settler states with an 'Indocentrism' that was deemed to be vital to the survival of the Indian Raj. From this point of view, the 1950s did not mark a break from some earlier era of

more liberal imperialism, but the institutional strengthening of an already-existing exclusionary racist regime at the core of the British Empire rather than at the peripheries of the 'British World'.

I have also argued that a pro-emigration stance implanted a core tenet of social imperialism in the British state from the 1920s onwards, whereby subsidised emigration paid for by public spending linked racist migration policy to racist economic policy and racist geopolitics. All of which confirms Nadine El-Enany's (2020) argument that British popular racism and restrictive citizenship legislation in the 1960s did not mark a turn away from a previously liberal or absent-minded politics of migration. The restrictive laws of the 1960s and 1970s reflected, as Schwarz argues, the bringing home of the settler-colonial logic of exclusion. This logic may have emerged in response to 'New Commonwealth' immigration, but its foundations were laid as legislators sought to strengthen ties with the settler Commonwealth through emigration at least since the 1920s and in policy and political terms since perhaps the 1870s-80s. Thus my argument is that the white supremacist logic of what I call here Britain's 'emigration state' had been *intensifying* over the preceding 70 years or so prior to the landing of the HMT *Windrush*. Flipping our primary focus regarding state racism from immigration to emigration reveals that successive governments' citizenship and migration legislation sought to uphold emigration at one end of the 'British World' in the UK and accepted, to a greater or lesser extent, a globalised colour line at the other in the settler colonies.

In this sense I am appealing for a new chronology of 'modern Britain' that begins somewhere in the mid-19th century and that ends somewhere in the 1970s as the UK state and its migration regime was transformed by accession to the EEC. Like James Belich (2009), I think the Dominions are crucial to the beginning of this era and, like A.G. Hopkins (2008), I think that they are crucial to its ending. By drawing on histories of the 'colour line' for the period in between, we can analyse the interlacing of the financial and economic aspects of Britain's coupling and decoupling from its settler Commonwealth as a history of racial capitalism and global segregation. Writing this history in 2021 after Brexit, rather than 2008 (Hopkins) or 2009 (Belich), gives a different sense of the longevity and effects of the settler empire on British politics and society. Writing after Brexit and after the 'Windrush Scandal' it seems clear that while the 1970s did mark a new phase in Britain's modern history, the effects of the emigration state did not simply disappear: they lived on at the fringes of Conservative ideology and have crashed back into the centre of British politics to smash apart the UK's prior demographic-economic-constitutional settlement in the EU (as I have argued in Foks, 2020). As a contribution to the field of modern British studies, focusing on emigration can connect historiographies of the 'British World' with the 'new imperial history' in the service of analysing the constitutive structural effects of racism and of imperialism in the formation of what we now call the history of 'modern Britain'.

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DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data is publicly available.

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ENDNOTES

[1] The literature is large. For pioneering monographs: Holmes, 1988; Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1992; and for a recent overview: Panayi, 2014.

[2] Huge thanks to Jean for sharing a draft of her essay with me while I was writing this essay. [3] However, for recent publications that connect migration histories to the history of the welfare state and to imperial citizenship see Hammond Perry, 2015; Robbie Shilliam, 2018; Bhambra and Holmwood (2018). [4] Of course, scholars have written extensively about this great rush for the exit and have tended to focus on economic globalisation up to 1914, but mostly not beyond and almost never as part of a history of state building. For a key text in the economic history of British emigration: Baines, 2002. For a book that brings together much of the scholarship up to the First World War: Magee & Thompson, 2010. James Belich (2009) takes his analysis forward, briefly, into the interwar era, although the bulk of his story is centred on the middle of the 19th century. For a pioneering synthetic essay on empire migration that is bookended by the inter-war era, see Newbury, 1975. The closest thing to a survey of 19th century emigration's effects on British patterns of politics and statemaking is Offer, 1989.

[5] For an important overview: Harling, 2001. For one important trend in the historical sociology of modern Britain: Trentmann, 2006, see also Mann, 2006. There is no single book that can sum up the historiography of the welfare state. For the 'warfare state' see: Edgerton, 2006. For one account of the role of bureaucracy and expertise see Joyce, 2013.

[6] Since beginning to write this paper I have found a body of work by geographers and scholars of policy studies working on emigration, diasporas and citizenship. See for instance the work of Raggazzi, 2014. I also found an article using the term 'emigration state': Gamlen, 2008. The interest of these latter scholars is very different to mine, but I hope to read more of this literature in future to try to connect my research to debates in these other fields.

[7] This subject awaits its historian. For a starting point that gives a comparative overview of government subsidies see Baines, 1995, pp. 46–48.

[8] Emigration was a component of statecraft outside Europe, too, with the Chinese, Russian and Japanese empires using emigration schemes to project power from their metropolitan cores into their peripheries throughout the 19th and 20th centuries: McKeown, 2011: 49; Bennett, 1992. The United States, we might imagine, was both an immigration and an emigration state after 1776, expanding like a squeeze box: sucking in migrants and expelling them across the continent to overrun and expropriate Native American nations.

[9] On comparative migration figures that put the UK in comparison to other European states see Baines, 2002, p. 10. [10] For some indication of how migration regimes can be studied comparatively see Cohen, 1995. [11] In future research I plan to extend the second part of Perry's argument that we must centre Black British, imperial and colonised peoples' resistance to these processes, which I touch on only briefly in this article.

[12] See also, Paul, 1997 for a similar approach that focuses on the immediate postwar decades. [13] Yet, as John Hobson and Jason Sharman (2005) argue, empire states are no less statelike because they are ordered from subunits that often come into conflict with one another and with the core: pp. 72-75. In Philip Abrams' (1988) terms, conflict, lack of coordination and disunity are all features of states—the salient issues are subordination and legitimacy. The Dominions were subordinated and their legitimacy and very existence relied on British fiscal-military power—mostly sea power—but also British capital and, crucially for my argument here, British immigration. This subordination continued until at least after the Second World War and arguably into the late 1960s and perhaps beyond: Hopkins, 2008. Whether these states have, in fact, ever been through 'decolonisation' depends, of course, on whether the relationship is between the settler state and the British state or the settler state and Indigenous peoples.

[14] Mary Daly (2001) explains how Irish citizenship between 1922 and 1948 vis a vis British subject status was a matter of continual conflict and complex shifting legal interpretation between the Free State and the UK.

[15] For an overview, see the essays collected in part III of Biagini & Daly 2017. In his essay in this collection, Kevin Kenny notes this discrepancy between Irish and English histories of emigration: p. 409.

[16] Stephen Constantine (2003) discusses some of the 'four nations' implications: pp. 24–25. Eric Richards (2004) narrates emigration from the four nations together.

[17] My thanks to Niamh Gallagher for pressing these points when I presented an earlier draft of this paper in Cambridge. [18] I am very grateful to one of my anonymous reviewers for clarifying that this is, indeed, what I am doing in this essay and for suggesting I read this piece.

[19] On empire as a type of state see Burbank & Cooper, 2010; See also Bhambra, 2020; and Bhambra & Holmwood, 2018. [20] For a foundational text in the study of settler economies see Denoon, 1983 and the important intervention in the literature about the specificity of settler colonialism and the land: Wolfe, 2001; see also the much less cited, although powerful analytical provocation Emmanuel, 1972.

[21] Were the British overseas a diaspora? I have followed Stephen Constantine's argument that we use the term 'overseas settlement' before 1940. Constantine thinks 'diaspora' might be more accurate after 1940. From the implications of his own argument, it seems that a better turning point for is the 1970s, not the 1940s, however. I have used 'diaspora' where the migration is more diverse than just from Britain or where I discuss, in the post 1940 era the sum total of Britons overseas in multiple settler states. For a discussion see Constantine, 2003.

[22] Although there is some suggestion that alliances emerged between Catholic Irish and Aboriginal and Māori peoples in the 'British World', but more research is needed, as explained in McCarthy (2017), 490.

[23] For estimates of child migrants: Moss et al., 2017, p. 647. For the figure of 16 million: Constantine, 1990, p. 1.

[24] My thanks to Christopher Lawson for pointing me to this article.

[25] See also Glynn (1981), which discusses a debate about limiting Irish migration to Great Britain in the 1920s: pp. 62–63. Thanks to Bernard Ryan for making me aware of this debate. [26] This distinction broadly maps onto Theda Skocpol's (2008) idea about the difference between 'Tocquevillian' and 'Weberian' state action.

[27] For some roots of this thinking see Levitan, 2015. For an overview of attitudes to emigration up to the 1930s see Thompson, 2000, Ch. 6. And for post-45: Constantine, 1998. [28]

My thanks to Brendan Simms for making me aware of the Nazi comparator.

[29] EMPIRE SETTLEMENT. (Hansard, 28 May 1924) https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1924/may/28/ empire-settlement#S5CV0174P0_19240528_HOC_415.

[30] For an outline of the vision see Thompson, 2000, Ch. 6.

[31] From what I can tell the best studies of this pivot to Empire remain: Drummond, 1972; Drummond, 1974.

[32] On the imperial turn of Britain's economy in the inter-war period see: de Bromhead et al., 2019. [33]

Leo Amery, 'Empire Settlement and Empire Development'—reprinted from *The Empire Review* 1923, 3, Leo Amery Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge, Box 1/4/12, Folder 1. [henceforth AMEL, followed by Box and Folder numbers]. [34]

For a succinct summary: 'letter from Mr Amery to Mr Baldwin, 24th July 1928', Document 80, in Ashton & Stockwell, 1996, Vol. 2, pp. 7–11.

[35] 'Inter-imperial trade' speech at Annual luncheon of The British Imperial Council of Commerce, Savoy Hotel, London, W C 2, June 10th 1925, p. 9 in AMEL 1/4/12 Fol 1. [36] For an overview of the hard power as well as economic importance of the settler colonies in the wider imperial system see Darwin, 2009, Ch. 4. [37]

'Empire Migration', *The Economist*, 11.4631(May 28th, 1932), 10.

[38] Although Dane Kennedy cautions against marking this date as the dawning of the 'hegemony' of social imperialism. Kennedy, 1988, p. 419. [39] My thanks to Rob Waters for pointing me towards this chapter. [40]

HC Deb 15 March 1967 vol 743 c515.

[41] Huge thanks to Sarah Stockwell for sending me a pre-publication draft of this essay.

[42] Thanks to Augusta Waldie for clarifying this distinction in her comments on a previous draft of this essay.

[43] How indenture was squared with liberal imperialism and free trade is the subject of Jonathan Connolly's (2018, 2019) recent publications.

[44] For the relatively sparse coverage of the settler colonies see the chapters in, for instance: Hall and Rose, 2006. For the emergence of an imperial ethnicity see: Darwin, 'Empire and Ethnicity'.

[45] The literature on the British World is now huge. For two pioneering works see *The British World: Diaspora,* Bridge & Fedorowich, 2004) and Constantine, 1990). For a critical overview of the recent literature see Bright & Dilley, 2017.

[46] Anti-Asian legislation can be profitably compared with the anti-Irish prejudice discussed in the previous section of this essay. While Irish migrants faced prejudice from English and Scottish migrants in the settler colonies, Irish emigration was encouraged with assisted passages to Australia, New Zealand and Canada at the same time as those Dominions curtailed the free migration of Indian subjects of the British Empire and legislation was passed like the 1901 Australian Immigration Restriction Act that barred 'non-whites'. Until 1922 Irish migrants were citizens of the UK and after then, retained their status as British subjects until 1948, although Free State legislation in the 1930s sought to sever these ties: Daly, 2001. This contrasts with the migration of 'aliens' from Southern and Eastern Europe who faced migration restrictions in the 1920s: Piperoglou, 2020.

[47] Amongst a large literature see Gerzina, 2020; Bressey, 2007; Bressey, 2010.

[48] My thanks to Bernard Ryan for sharing his article with me. The position of Irish citizens in this migration regime carried over the ambiguous status of Irish nationals in the UK from the inter-war years, where, as citizens of the Free State, they had been, in the eyes of the UK authorities, at least, British subjects. In 1948-49 the UK treated Irish citizens as if they were British subjects. On the connections between Ireland, the UK, ethnicity and immigration status see Swift & Campbell, 2017, p. 528; Glynn, 1981, pp. 62–65. And for a comparative study of prejudice faced by Irish migrants in postwar Britain with 'new Commonwealth' migrants see Schaffer & Saima, 2018. [49]

These numbers are debatable. According to Ceri Peach, the period 1951–1961 saw net immigration of 120,000, which includes European migration: in Peach, 2002, p. 265. Mitchell, using passenger numbers puts the number for 1951-61 at −603,000: Mitchell, 1992, pp. 132, 135. N.L. Tranter puts the number higher at −711,000 for the period 1951–1963: Tranter, 1996, p. 27. All of this suggests that net *imperial* migration was almost certainly negative. It is almost certain that more emigrants went to the empire as settlers than arrived from the 'new Commonwealth' in Britain. [50]

Lord Salisbury to Lord Swinton, 20th March 1954, in ed. Goldsworthy, 1994, p. 394. [51]

''Colonial Immigrants': Cabinet conclusions, 13th Jan 1955' in Goldsworthy, 1994, 396.

[52] Goldsworthy, 1994, 396.

[53] This process must have been easier in the 1960s with the India Office gone and the promulgation of Indocentric arguments (often 'liberal imperialist') no longer forcing governments to adopt a conciliatory tone of imperial citizenship or to lobby against

migration control. For some support for this contention see Patel, 2021. Appeals to a 'Commonwealth ideal' performed the legitimating function of liberal imperialism in the postwar era, but without any equivalent administrative counter-power pushing against restricted mobility from within the state, only from those activists outside it allied to a few parliamentarians. A thorough overview of the fragility of the universalist Commonwealth ideal in the face of immigration to Britain is given in: Nasar, 2020.

54 On views of emigration as a 'yardstick' of nationalist failure in Ireland see Glynn, 1981, p. 56.

55 Focusing on the economic and constitutional aspects of the settler Commonwealth, A.G. Hopkins (2008) marks the beginning of the break in 1961 with the first attempts by British statesmen to join the EEC. Decoupling proceeded to take place over the subsequent decade. My argument about 'patrials' suggests that in migration policy, at least, a filament of 'filial' connection outlasted the economic and constitutional divorce that Hopkins marks with the 1981 UK Nationality Act.

56 Schwarz has made a similar move to mine in his later work, especially in *The White Man's World*, although his emphasis in that book is on culture rather than mobility and political economy per se. I see our analyses as fundamentally complementary, however.

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